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In this paper I provide an account of the way in which the domain of spoken 
communication is metaphorically constructed in English, on the basis of the analysis of 
over 450 metaphorical references to speech activity in a corpus of contemporary written 
British English. I show how spoken communication is mainly structured via a set of 
source domains that conventionally apply to a wide variety of target domains, such as the 
source domains of MOTION, PHYSICAL TRANSFER, PHSYICAL CONSTRUCTION and PHYSICAL 
SUPPORT. Each of these source domains structures a particular aspect of speech activity, 
such as the achievement of communicative goals, the expression of meanings and ideas, 
the performance of speech acts, the negotiation of mutual relationships, and so on. I 
suggest that the particular conceptual mappings that underlie the main patterns in my data 
are best seen in terms of Grady’s (1997) notion of primary metaphors, i.e. as simple, 
basic mappings that have a firm experiential basis and that apply to a wide range of 
different areas of experience (e.g. “HELP/ASSISTANCE IS SUPPORT”). However, I also show 
that the main primary metaphors involved in structuring the domain of speech activity 
can be combined into a single overall physical scenario in which interactants can move in 
different directions, place themselves in different positions in relation to each other, come 
into contact with each other in different ways, physically produce texts/utterances/speech 
acts, physically pass texts/utterances/speech acts to each other, and make meanings 
visible to each other in different ways. Finally, I argue that a corpus-based methodology 
has much to offer to metaphor research, particularly in the extrapolation of conceptual 





From the very early days of cognitive metaphor theory, a great deal of attention has been 
devoted to the way in which speakers of English metaphorically construct the domain of 
communication in everyday language. Reddy’s (1979) account of the “conduit” metaphor 
influenced most later discussions of metaphors for communication (e.g. Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 10-12; Grady 1997, 1998; Kövecses 2002: 73-4, Taylor 2002: 490), while 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Metaphors We Live By opened with an equally influential 
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discussion of  the conceptual metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR” . A number of other studies 
have pointed out further source domains that are conventionally applied, in English, to 
the domain of communication, including particularly the domain of motion (Sweetser 
1987, Kövecses 2002: 80, Goossens et al. 1995, Traugot and Dasher 2002: 190ff.) 
 
In this paper I develop and partly correct the view of the metaphorical construction of 
communication that has been presented so far, on the basis of the analysis of over 3,500 
references to speech activity in a corpus of written British English. I will argue that my 
analysis provides a more complete (although by no means exhaustive) account of how 
spoken communication is metaphorically talked about in English, and that this in turn 
leads to the formulation of more reliable hypotheses about underlying conceptual 
metaphors than is the case when data is less extensive, less varied, and, in some cases, 
partly generated by the analyst(s) (see Vanparys 1995: 2-6 for similar considerations). 
 
My main overall finding is that, in my data, speech activity is metaphorically talked about 
by means of expressions that: 
1) Potentially evoke a fairly wide range of different source domains (for example, the 
use of the verb “attack” in “Delors attacked Balladur’s idea of a “Europe of 
circles”” potentially evokes the domain of PHYSICAL AGGRESSION; the use of the verb 
“support” in “Mr Milosevic supported the plan then” potentially evokes the domain 
of PHYSICAL SUPPORT); 
2) Are also often used metaphorically to talk about domains of experience other than 
communication (for example, the verb “attack” can be used to talk about illness in 
expressions such as “the infection attacks the lymphatic system” from the British 
National Corpus, hereafter the BNC;  the verb “support” can be used to talk about 
financial contributions in expression such as “Our work in the African continent [. . .] 
is supported by Tear Fund”, from the BNC). 
In other words, the highly complex domain of speech activity is, not surprisingly, 
conventionally structured via a number of different metaphorical source domains. These 
source domains are not specific to speech activity in particular, but have a very wide 
metaphorical “scope”, i.e. they conventionally apply to a wide range of target domains 
(Kövecses 2000b, 2002: 108ff.).  
 
The complexity of the particular target domain I am concerned with mostly lies in the 
fact that  speech activity involves a number of different aspects, including, for example, 
the production of utterances, the performance of illocutionary acts, the expression and 
exchange of ideas, the expression of agreement or disagreement with others’ views, the 
expression and negotiation of mutual relationships, the achievement of goals via speech, 
and so on. In my data, each of these different aspects is consistently structured by one or 
more wide-scope source domain(s). In order to provide a broad overview of my findings, 
I list below the source domains that feature most prominently in my data, and the aspects 
of speech activity they conventionally apply to. As I will show in more detail at the end 
of the paper, the ordering of the list reflects, in descending order, the frequency of 
occurrence of expressions relating to each particular source domain in my data (N.B 
unless otherwise indicated, examples are taken from my corpus; the relevant 
metaphorically used words are underlined): 
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• The source domain of TRANSFER (OF OBJECTS) is applied to the expression of meanings, 
thoughts, ideas (which Reddy 1979 called “ repertoire members” or RMs), and to the 
production of utterances and speech acts (e.g. “Sir Hugh gave his assessment last 
Monday”); 
• The source domain of PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION (OF OBJECTS) is applied to the 
production of utterances and speech acts (e.g. “make a comment”) and to the further 
expression of similar meanings and ideas to those that have already been previously 
expressed (e.g. “But he added: “We need to work out whether the pluses outweigh the 
minuses”); 
• The source domain of VISIBILITY/VISUAL REPRESENTATION is applied to the expression 
of meanings and to the process of enabling others to understand meanings and 
information (e.g. “I pointed out to David that these people didn’t really appreciate 
their music”); 
• The source domain of MOVEMENT is applied to the performance of speech acts and to 
the pursuit of goals via speech (e.g. “Mary’s father stepped in with congratulations”); 
• The source domain of PHYSICAL AGGRESSION is applied to the expression of 
disagreement and criticism, the attempt to discredit others and their views, and the 
adoption of a forceful, antagonistic attitude in communication (e.g. “sniping at the 
Blair style of leadership”, “bombarding with questions”); 
• The source domain of PHYSICAL PROXIMITY is applied to the expression of agreement 
and solidarity with others and their views (e.g. “Afterwards Mr Milosevic [. . .] 
backed the proposals”); 
• The source domain of PHYSICAL PRESSURE is applied to the attempt to achieve 
particular objectives via speech or to force others to engage in communication (e.g. 
“the Mirror continued to press him over [. . .]”); 
• The source domain of PHYSICAL SUPPORT is applied to the expression of agreement 
and solidarity with others and their views or proposals (e.g. “Mr Milosevic supported 
the plan then”). 
 
In his work on complex target domains such as friendship and happiness, Kövecses (2000: 
87ff.; 2002: 84ff.) similarly found that they are structured by a set of source domains with 
a very wide metaphorical scope, each applying to a particular aspect of the relevant 
emotion concept.2 
 
My findings can also be expressed in terms of Grady’s notion of “primary metaphors”, 
which are defined as simple, basic mappings that (i) have a strong experiential basis, (ii) 
motivate metaphorical expressions that can be applied to different domains of experience, 
and (iii) combine to produce many different complex metaphors (see Grady 1997, 1999). 
For example, the primary metaphor “HELP IS SUPPORT” can explain the metaphorical use 
of the verb “support” in relation to communication (as in “Mr Milosevic supported the 
plan then”) and in relation to other contexts (as in “Our work in the African continent 
[. . .] is supported by Tear Fund”, from the BNC). Similarly, the primary metaphor 
“DAMAGE IS PHYSICAL HARM” can be said to underlie the metaphorical use of the verb 
“attack” in relation to communication (as in “Delors attacked Balladur’s idea of a 
“Europe of Circles””) and in relation to many other contexts (as in “the infection attacks 
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the lymphatic system”, from the BNC). Within this perspective, a large part of my data 
can be explained in terms of a range primary metaphors that are not specific to 
communication in particular, but which combine to form “complex” metaphors for 
communication (e.g. “ANTAGONISTIC COMMUNICATION IS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION”). At the 
end of the paper I will show how these metaphors, although not always compatible with 
each other, can be combined to form a single overall conceptualization of spoken 
communication in terms of a physical scenario; within this scenario, interactants can 
stand in different positions, move in different directions, come into physical contact or 
conflict in different ways, construct their utterances/speech acts, pass their 
utterances/speech acts on to others, or make meanings visible to others in different ways. 
 
These two approaches to the analysis of my data (i.e. via a set of wide-scope source 
domains or via a set of primary metaphors) are not at all incompatible with each other. 
Indeed, Kövecses (2002: 109ff.) argues that each wide-scope source domain has a “major 
theme” or “main meaning focus”, which he describes as “the culturally agreed-on 
conceptual material associated with the source that it conventionally imparts to its 
targets” (Kövecses 2002: 118). The main meaning focus of each source domain gives rise 
to small number of “central mappings”, whereby its most culturally salient and distinctive 
aspects structure some aspects of a wide variety of target domains (Kövecses 2002: 110-
12). Kövecses explains that these central mappings can be seen as “simple” conceptual 
metaphors that combine to form “complex” conceptual metaphors, and explicitly equates 
these simple metaphors/central mappings with Grady’s primary metaphors (Kövecses 
2002: 111). In evaluating this equivalence, it is important to note that Grady and 
Kövecses adopt slightly different criteria and methods for determining simple/primary 
metaphors: Kövecses tends to start from large, wide-scope source domains (e.g. FIRE), 
from  which he derives “simple” metaphors (e.g. “THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF INTENSITY IS 
THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF HEAT” and “CHANGE OF INTENSITY IS CHANGE OF HEAT”); in 
contrast, Grady tends to start from patterns of metaphorical expressions that apply to a 
wide range of target domains (e.g. “Trading has really heated up this week”, “Things 
have cooled down at the paper since the election”, Grady 1997: 290) in order to arrive at 
“primary” metaphors (e.g. “INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT”). As a consequence of these 
methodological differences, the two approaches may not always arrive at exactly the 
same conclusions, but Kövecses (2002: 110-12) does show significant convergence of 
results in a number of cases. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will divide my analysis into sections on the basis of the 
most prominent source domains listed above, since this affords a useful overall view of 
the main general patterns I have found in my data. However, in explaining specific 
groups of examples, I will mostly refer to primary metaphors, for two main reasons: first, 
my “bottom-up” methodology is particularly compatible with Grady’s approach; second, 
a considerable part of my data can be best accounted for in terms of some of the primary 
metaphors Grady has already proposed (Grady 1997, 1998), even though he did not 
always explicitly mention their relevance to the domain of (spoken) communication. As I 
go along, I will also point out how many relevant source domains have an image-
schematic basis (see Pauwels and Simon-Vanderbergen 1995 for a detailed discussion), 
which also supports the overall claim that the complex domain of speech activity is 
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My data was extracted from a corpus that was constructed and annotated for speech, 
writing, and thought presentation (hereafter SW&TP) by a team working at Lancaster 
University in the 1990s (see Wynne et al. 1998, Semino et al. 1999, Semino and Short 
2004). It contains 120 text samples of approximately 2,000 words each, amounting to a 
total of 258,348 words of (late) 20th century written British English. The corpus is equally 
divided into three main genre sections: prose fiction (87,709 words); newspaper news 
reports (83,603 words); and biography and autobiography (87,036 words). The genres 
were selected as prime examples of fictional and non-fictional narrative text-types, since 
the presentation of others’ words and thoughts is particularly central, although not 
exclusive to, narrative texts. Each of the three genre sections is in turn equally divided 
into a “serious” and a “popular” sub-section. For example, in the newspaper section of 
the corpus, half the samples are taken from broadsheet newspapers and half from tabloid 
newspapers. For the other two genres, a number of criteria were applied in order to 
include equal amounts of extracts from popular as opposed to serious books (see Semino 
et al. 1999 and Semino and Short 2004: 19ff. for our criteria in implementing these 
distinctions). 
 
The corpus was manually annotated for categories of SW&TP, such as Direct Speech, 
Free Indirect Thought, and so on. I do not have the space here to describe the annotation 
system we applied to the corpus (but see Wynne et al. 1998 and Semino and Short 2004: 
26ff. for a detailed discussion). What is relevant for the purposes of this paper is that the 
availability of an annotated corpus makes it possible to obtain concordances for each of 
the categories of SW&TP included within the annotation system. Here I will focus on 
two particular textual phenomena that were captured by our annotation system, namely 
the speech presentation category known as the “Narrator’s Representation of Speech 
Acts” (NRSA), and speech reporting clauses. 
 
The NRSA category, which was originally introduced in Leech and Short (1981), 
captures those expressions which report one or more utterances by referring to their 
(supposed) illocutionary force or speech act value. The following is a prototypical 
example from the newspaper section of the corpus: 
 
1. At one point during negotiations, [. . .] he demanded a helicopter (The Daily 
Telegraph, 29/4/1996) 
 
NRSAs typically include a verb referring to a speech act (e.g. demand in example 1), and 
a noun phrase or prepositional phrase providing an indication of the content of the 
relevant utterance (e.g. a helicopter in example 1). NRSAs can also be realized by noun 
phrases where the head noun refer to a speech act (e.g. demands for tighter gun controls).  
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In practice, the scope of the NRSA tag also includes some expressions that do not refer to 
speech act values in the strictest sense, but to speech activity more generally. The use of 
the verbs “attack” and “support” in expressions such as “Delors attacked Balladur’s idea 
of …” and “Mr Milosevic supported the plan then”, for example, cannot be easily 
accommodated within classifications that are based on a strict definition of (verbs 
referring to) illocutionary force (e.g. (Austin 1962, Searle 1979, Bach and Harnish 1979). 
Expressions such as these can, however, be accounted for within Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl’s (1981) Speech Act Classification, which includes “any kind of (aspect of) 
speech activity designating verb”, for a total of 4,800 expressions (Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl 1981: 16). This, they argue, results in “a more relevant class of expressions 
with respect to linguistic behaviour than the ‘performative’ verbs” (Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl 1981: 16). 
 
The main formal criterion for the application of the NRSA tag was that there was no 
grammatical separation between a reporting clause and a reported clause, since this 
structure is typical of the category of Indirect Speech presentation (e.g. The Indirect 
Speech tag was applied to examples such as the second half of the sentence: Hundreds of 
protesters and politicians gathered in central Moscow, demanding that Russia halt the 
invasion.) (see Semino and Short 2004: 52-3 for more detail). 
 
As far as speech reporting clauses are concerned, it is well known that they are normally 
used to introduce stretches of Direct Speech (e.g. She said in She said: “No”) or Indirect 
Speech (e.g. Labour claimed in Labour claimed that it had recruited another high profile 
Conservative MP). They typically include a reference to the relevant speaker(s) and a 
verb referring to speech activity (e.g. “say”, “claim”, etc.). However, the same 
introductory function can be performed by non-clausal structures, such as According to 
one senior officer or calls by IRA hardliners to [. . .]. We therefore used the tag NRS 
(“Narrator’s Report of Speech”) to annotate all the stretches of text that perform the 
function of introducing stretches of Direct Speech, Indirect Speech (and, in a few cases, 
Free Indirect Speech), regardless of their grammatical structure (see Semino and Short 
2004: 35ff; see also Halliday 1994: 263 and Thompson 1996: 518 et passim). Although 
the examples I will discuss below are all clausal in structure, I will continue to use the 
acronym NRS, for consistency and ease of reference. 
 
Together, NRSs and NRSAs capture the vast majority of references to speech activity in 
the corpus. My analysis in this paper is based on concordances containing 2,563 instances 
of NRS and 985 instances of NRSA respectively (NB: the latter figure is lower than the 
total figure for NRSA in the corpus given in Semino and Short (2004: 67), since I have 
excluded all borderline and embedded cases of NRSA. The same strategy was applied to 
the concordancing of NRSs). In analyzing the concordances, I regarded individual 
instances of NRS/NRSA as metaphorical when: 
(i) one or more of the lexical items that, in context, refer to speech activity have a 
more basic current sense that is not to do with verbal communication, and   
(ii) the speech activity sense of the relevant expressions can be said to be motivated 
by the more basic sense via a cross-domain mapping where the target is speech 
activity and the source is a different domain.  
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The emphasis on current basic senses in the first criterion above means that I do not 
include etymological metaphors (e.g. verbs such as “insist”, “propose”, “express”; see, 
for example, Sweetser 1987, Traugot and Dasher 2002). However, in her diachronic 
study of metaphors for thought and speech, Sweetser (1987) found that the same 
underlying metaphorical mappings were “both synchronically lively and diachronically 
important in past meaning shifts” (Sweetser 1987: 455; emphasis in original). Although I 
will not be able to deal with this issue, my own data supports this general observation. 
 
Consider the following example of NRSA from the corpus: 
 
2. The Americans [. . .] were now bombarding the security man at the front gate with 
questions about just which building was the actual home of the Benny Hill Show 
(Smith, J. The Benny Hill Story, 1988, p. 96) 
 
In (2) the verb “bombard” is used to describe the way in which a group of American 
tourists asked a security man questions about the location of the studio in which English 
comedian Benny Hill records his show. However, the verb “bombard” has a more basic 
sense that is not to do with verbal communication, but with the dropping of bombs, 
typically on military targets. The speech activity sense of “bombard” (which is 
conventional in English) can be explained in term of a mapping from the domain 
typically associated with the basic sense of “bombard” (WAR or, more generally, ARMED 
PHYSICAL AGGRESSION) to the domain of verbal communication. This explains why the use 
of “bombard” in reference to asking questions suggests a persistent, forceful and possibly 
aggressive attitude. I will return to this example below. 
 
According to my analysis, 249 instances of NRS out of the total 2,563 examples in the 
concordance involve metaphorical references to speech activity, amounting to 
approximately 10 per cent of the total. For NRSA, I analysed as metaphorical 214 out of 
the total 985 instances included in the relevant concordance, amounting to approximately 
22 per cent of the total. The fact that the proportion of metaphorical examples is lower for 
NRS than for NRSA is largely due to the preponderance of the verb “say” in speech 
reporting clauses. Overall, therefore, my claims in the rest of this paper are based on the 
analysis of 463 authentic metaphorical references to speech activity in a balanced corpus 
of written British English. 
 
The use of corpus data does not, of course, necessarily lead to findings that could not 
have been arrived at via other methods. However, corpora enable researchers to study 
naturally-occurring linguistic patterns on a large scale, and therefore tend to provide a 
greater number and variety of examples than can be generated by intuition or by the 
analysis of small amounts of data. As a consequence, by adopting a corpus methodology, 
I aim to place my claims about possible underlying conceptual metaphors on a firm and 
explicit empirical footing. This will hopefully partly address the concerns expressed in 
several recent studies about the lack of a rigorous and explicit methodology, within 
cognitive metaphor theory, for extrapolating conceptual metaphors from linguistic data 





I will present my findings by considering in turn each of the main patterns of 
metaphorical expressions in my data and the source domains they relate to. The ordering 
of the various sub-section is not based on frequency, however, but on the role played by 
each source domain in the overall metaphorical scenario that I briefly sketched out above 
and that I will present in detail at the end of the paper. I will therefore begin by 
discussing expressions that metaphorically present speech activity in terms of motion, 
and then go on to consider expressions relating to physical proximity, physical pressure, 
physical aggression, physical construction, transfer (of objects), and visibility. As will 
become clear in the course of the discussion, the distinctions between patterns that are 
discussed in different sections are often not clear-cur, as individual expressions may 
evoke more than one potential source domain, and the same conceptual material can 




Expressions relating to movement 
A number of studies have shown that, in English, communication is often metaphorically 
constructed in terms of motion in space, both synchronically and diachronically (e.g. 
Sweetser 1987, Emanatian 1997, Traugot and Dasher 2002: 190ff., Kövecses 2002: 80). 
In my data, 35 instances of NRS/NRSA contain expressions that have physical senses 
relating to movement. As noted in other studies, however (e.g. Sweetser 1987, Vanparys 
1995: 26-28), there is considerable variation in the nature of the movement involved, 
particularly with respect to the entity that is presented as moving, the space where 
movement takes place, and the destination of the movement. 
 
Movement towards a speech act or the interaction  
In the examples below, the action of taking a turn in conversation or of producing a 
speech act that others have already produced in the same context is metaphorically 
expressed in terms of physical approach:  
 
3. John Major also joined the condolences in a message to Mr Howard. (The 
Independent, 29/4/1996) 
4. Mary’s father stepped in with congratulations. (A. Huxley, Point Counter Point, 
1928, p. 139) 
 
The verb “join” has a basic physical sense relating to moving physical entities towards 
each other so that they touch or become connected. It also has a more specific physical 
sense relating to moving towards other people, in order to do things together or to foster 
emotional intimacy (e.g. I sat down and Katrina soon joined me again, from the BNC). 
This motivates the conventional metaphorical use of “join” to indicate the act of 
becoming a member of an organization or a group (e.g. “I joined Amnesty in 1968”, from 
the BNC). In example (3), however, the verb “join” is followed by a direct object 
indicating a speech act (the condolences). Hence John Major’s performance of a speech 
act that others have already performed in a particular context is metaphorically 
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constructed in terms of movement towards the speech act. It could also be argued that 
“the condolences” refers metonymically to those who have already publicly expressed 
their condolences, which would bring this particular use of the verb closer to the most 
conventional metaphorical sense to do with becoming part of a group.  
 
The metaphorical use of “join” in example (3) can be explained in more than one way. If 
we start from the physical sense of “join” that relates to goal-directed movement,  we can 
see uses such as (3) as instantiations of the primary metaphors “ACTION IS SELF-
PROPELLED MOTION” (e.g. “I’ve got to start moving on this project”; Grady 1997: 287) 
and “ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ARRIVING AT A DESTINATION” (e.g. “He’ll ultimately be 
successful, but he’s not there yet”; Grady 1997: 286; see also “PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS” in Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 52-3). These metaphors, Grady argues, are 
experientially grounded in correlations between, respectively, “performing an action and 
moving” and “achieving a purpose and moving to a spatial location” (Grady 1997: 286-
87). These particular metaphors are also clearly relevant to example (4), where the action 
of performing a speech act is metaphorically presented, via the verb “step in”, in terms of 
movement into a location. In other words, in (4) the interaction between the characters is 
constructed as a physical space, so that taking a turn in a conversation corresponds to 
entering this physical space.  
 
Another possible explanation for example (3) focuses on the fact that the particular kind 
of movement evoked by “join” results in physical proximity. From this point of view, 
examples such as (3) can be related to other expressions that construct agreement and 
solidarity in terms of physical proximity, such as “Whose side are you on?” and “I’ll 
side with him every time”, which Grady (1997: 297) explains via the primary metaphor 
“AGREEMENT/ SOLIDARITY IS BEING ON THE SAME SIDE”. In example (3), however, it is a 
commonality of (expressed) feeling, attitude and purpose that is partly constructed as 
physical proximity. I will return this example in the section where I discuss other 
expressions that construct spoken communication in terms of physical proximity among 
participants. 
 
Movement towards or away from the goal of communication 
Some metaphorical NRSAs contain expressions in which speech activity is constructed in 
terms of movement along a path towards or away from a destination. Consider the 
examples below: 
 
5. “No, don’t misunderstand me,” Constance went on. “I was thinking more of 
myself than her. […]”  
6. Yesterday Mr Haigh [. . .] back tracked a little (The News of the World, 11/12/94) 
 
In example (5) the reporting clause (NRS) includes a highly conventional metaphorical 
use of the phrasal verb “go on” to refer to the act of resuming talk or continuing to talk. 
The verb “go on” is of course conventionally used to refer metaphorically to the 
continuation of any process, action or behaviour (e.g. “Goldberg went on typing”, from 
the BNC). This can be explained in terms of the primary metaphors “AN EVENT IS THE 
MOTION OF AN OBJECT” (e.g. “The concert went until 4 o’clock”; Grady 1997: 286) and 
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“ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION”  which apply generally to events and human 
activities. Examples such as (5) show that the latter metaphor also applies to speech 
activity in particular. 
Example (6) is an instance of a highly conventional metaphorical use of the verb “back 
track” to indicate the expression of different and/or weaker views than previously 
expressed. As suggested earlier, the primary metaphor “ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ARRIVING 
AT A DESTINATION” also applies to conversational purposes. Indeed, English has a number 
of conventional expressions whereby (successful) communication (or, more precisely, the 
successful verbal expression of one’s thoughts or feelings) is constructed in terms of 
forward movement towards a destination, as in the following extract from the BNC: 
“Herr Nordern said ‘Get to the point can’t you.’ ‘I’m getting there’, Bodo said.”. Here 
the most relevant topic or piece information is presented as the end point of motion along 
a path. In this context, it is therefore possible to explain how, in examples such as (6), 
moving backward corresponds to verbally declaring a (partial) change of mind.  
A more extended realization of “ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ARRIVING AT A DESTINATION” in 
the context of speech activity is given below: 
 
7. Bunty still has to run through all our names until she reaches mine  (Atkinsons, K. 
Behind the Scenes at the Museum, 1995, p. 280) 
 
Here the first-person narrator, who is the youngest child in her family, talks about how 
her mother (Bunty) mistakenly says the names of all her other children before finally 
saying the narrator’s own name. This process is metaphorically presented, via the phrasal 
verb “run through”, as rapid movement in space. Here the path along which the 
movement occurs corresponds to the list of children’s names, and the destination is the 
intended linguistic expression (in this case, the narrator’s own name).  
 
Movement without a destination 
All of the expressions I have considered so far in this section present speech activity in 
terms of intentional, goal-directed motion. This is not the case, however, in the examples 
below: 
 
8. friends started deserting her as word spread that Ariel had died of Aids. (Today, 
5/12/1994) 
9. In October 1988 stories began circulating that Kylie had been the victim of a 
crazed sex-attacker. (Stone, S. Kylie Minogue: The Superstar Next Door, 1990, p. 
57)  
 
In both examples reference is made to a process whereby an unspecified number of 
individuals told others about sensitive private information about a particular person, so 
that, eventually, many people knew about it. In both cases this is presented, from the 
point of view of the person in question, as apparently uncontrollable and undirected 
movement on the part of the utterances/texts themselves (“word”, “stories”): the verb 
“spread” has a physical sense to do with substances (such as liquid) moving outwards in 
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all directions to cover a large area, while “circulate” has a physical sense to do with 
entities or substances (such as air) moving around continuously within an enclosed space. 
It is therefore important to note that, while the other types of expressions discussed above 
can all be related to the basic PATH image schema, here metaphorical motion does not 
take place along a path, but outwards from a central point in the case of “spread” and 
cyclically within a particular space in the case of “circulate”.  In both cases, the relevant 
physical movement is normally unintentional and hard to control, and, in both cases, the 
verbs in question have related metaphorical uses that are not to do with speech activity 
(e.g. “This problem has spread to the UK” , “Even then, Jobs predicts, illegal copies will 
circulate”, from the BNC). While expressions such as these can be related to primary 
metaphors such as Grady’s (1997: 186) “CHANGE IS MOTION” and “AN EVENT IS THE 
MOTION OF AN OBJECT”, they also seem to suggest a more specific metaphorical 
conceptualization of uncontrollable, harmful events or behaviour in terms of the 
uncontrollable movement of entities or substances.  
 
Overall, the expressions I have analysed in this section account for 7.5 per cent of all 
metaphorical instances of NRS/NRSA in my data. They all suggest a conceptualization of 
spoken communication in terms of motion in space, but, as I have shown, they differ 
significantly in terms of the precise nature of that motion and the kind of speech activity 
it is metaphorically applied to. Hence, I have explained them in terms of (a small set of) 
different primary metaphors.  
 
Expressions relating to physical proximity 
Nine metaphorical NRSAs in my data (i.e. approximately four per cent of all my 
metaphorical NRSAs) include expressions whose physical senses are to do with physical 
proximity without contact. Most of these expressions involve metaphorical uses of the 
verbs “back” and “stand by” as in the extracts below: 
 
10. Afterwards Mr Milosevic [. . .] backed the proposals (The Daily Telegraph, 
5/12/1994) 
11. A vicar who told his congregation “Santa’s a fake” stood by his words yesterday. 
(The Daily Express, 12/12/1994) 
 
The verb “back” has a number of physical senses, the most relevant of which indicates 
that an entity is positioned (closely) behind another. The verb “stand by” is similar, 
except for the fact that it indicates standing beside rather than standing behind. Both 
verbs also have several conventional metaphorical senses, including that of providing  
assistance, or being ready to provide assistance, in a number of non-physical, generally 
social, contexts (e.g. “Our Home Care teams are made up of doctors and nurses backed 
by a network of trained and active volunteers”, and “In Hindu families, therefore, often 
the women members stand by each other in times of stress and distress”, from the BNC). 
Examples such as (10) and (11) show how the metaphorical use of these verbs also 
applies to communicative interaction (whether the relevant entity is another person, a 
particular view, a previous utterance, the contents of a text, and so on).  
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These examples can be broadly explained with reference to image schemata such as 
CENTRE-PERIPHERY and NEAR-FAR (Johnson 1987: 124-5). More specifically, they can be 
related to other types of expressions that Grady (1997) accounts for by means of primary 
metaphors. “EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY” is proposed by Grady in order to explain 
expressions such as “My sister and I are very close” (Grady 1997: 293). Here the 
experiential motivation lies in the correlation between being emotionally intimate with 
someone and being physically close to them (see also “INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS” in Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980: 52). This metaphor could explain some metaphorical uses of “stand 
by” in particular, but does not fully explain examples such as (10) and (11). Another 
potentially relevant primary metaphor is “AGREEMENT/SOLIDARITY IS BEING ON THE SAME 
SIDE”, which, as I mentioned earlier, Grady proposes on the basis of linguistic 
expressions such as “I’ll side with him every time” (Grady 1997: 297). The expressions 
in my examples, however, evoke physical proximity generally, rather than specifically  
being on the same side, and, as I have mentioned, also have conventional metaphorical 
senses that relate to (potential) assistance generally rather than agreement in particular. 
This could be accounted for by a more general metaphor along the lines of 
AGREEMENT/SOLIDARITY/(POTENTIAL) ASSISTANCE IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY, which could 
in fact also explain the use of “join” in example (3) above. 
 
Expressions relating to physical support  
The corpus contains four NRSAs in which speech activity is metaphorically referred to 
by means of the word “support”, used either as a verb or as a noun. An example is given 
below:  
 
12. Mr Milosevic supported the plan then, but made little headway in persuading the 
Bosnian Serbs. (The Independent, 5 December 1994) 
 
Here “supported” does not just refer to Milosevic’s positive attitude towards the referent 
of “the plan”, but also to the expression of a positive attitude, which was essential to the 
realization of the plan in question. A similar use of “support” in relation to written 
communication is given below: 
 
13. Yet six months earlier he supported the very same regime in a letter to a fellow 
MP. (Today, 5/12/1994) 
 
In its physical sense, the verb “support” indicates that an entity prevents another from 
falling via physical contact and mutual physical position. As I mentioned earlier, 
“support” (both as a verb and as a noun) also has a wide range of conventional 
metaphorical senses: we conventionally talk about “moral support”, “financial support”, 
“political support”, and so on. Grady (1997: 283) explains such conventional 
metaphorical senses by proposing the primary metaphor “ASSISTANCE IS SUPPORT”, which, 
he argues, has its  experiential motivation in the correlation between physical support and 
the continued functionality or viability of physical objects (indeed, Grady (1997: 282) 
sees “ASSISTANCE IS SUPPORT” as a corollary of “FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS”, 
which gives rise to expressions such as “That record still stands”; see also “HELP IS 
SUPPORT” in Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 52). Grady’s linguistic examples of “ASSISTANCE 
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IS SUPPORT” do not relate specifically to verbal communication, but to social relations 
more generally: “Our conservation program needs your support” and “I’ve really been 
leaning on my friends the past few months” (Grady 1997: 283). Examples such as (12) 
and (13) show that the same primary metaphor can also explain the use of words such as 
“support” to indicate the verbal expression of a favourable attitude towards someone or 
something, which, in context, may result in the relevant entity achieving its goals, coming 
into being, continuing to exist, and so on. As is the case with the primary metaphors 
discussed in the previous sections, it is possible to argue that “ASSISTANCE IS SUPPORT”  
has an image-schematic basis, particularly with reference to the CONTACT and BALANCE 
image schemata (Johnson 1987). 
 
Expressions relating to physical pressure  
Eight of the metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in my data evoke a physical scenario where an 
agent (corresponding to the speaker) comes into contact with another entity (normally 
corresponding to the addressee) and exercises physical pressure on it. Consider the 
examples below: 
 
14. when the Mirror continued to press him over the stabbing of estranged wife 
Nicole (The Daily Mirror, 13/5/96) 
15. The UN’s military commanders, led by General Sir Michael Rose, have pressed 
for an end to Nato’s aerial presence over Bosnia (The Independent on Sunday, 
4/12/1994) 
 
In its most relevant physical sense, the verb “press” is to do with physically pushing 
against another entity. In the above examples, the notion of physical pressure is 
metaphorically mapped onto that of using language in order to get others to do something 
that they may not otherwise do, and/or that they may be reluctant to do. In (14), the direct 
object of “press” (him) refers to the addressee (O. J. Simpson), and the goal is to get him 
to respond to the allegation that he killed his wife. In (15) object of the the phrasal verb 
“press for” (an end to Nato’s aerial presence over Bosnia) refers to the speakers’ ultimate 
goal, and implicitly reveals the addressee on whom the pressure is exercised (Nato, or 
more precisely, the countries participating in a Nato-led campaign in Bosnia).  
 
Expressions evoking the notion of physical pressure have a wide range of related  
conventional metaphorical uses that go well beyond the target domain of communication. 
For example, we commonly talk of “peer pressure”, “moral pressure”, “work pressure”, 
and so on. All these expressions can be explained with reference to Grady’s primary 
metaphor “COMPULSION IS A COMPELLING FORCE” (Grady 1997: 287). Of the two 
linguistic examples that Grady provides for this particular metaphor, one does not relate 
to communication (“Vanity finally drove me to have the operation”), but the other is to 
do with the exercising of influence over somebody else’s behaviour via speech (“My 
friends pushed me into volunteering”). Grady identifies the experiential basis of 
“COMPULSION IS A COMPELLING FORCE” in “the correlation between deliberate action and 
motion through space” (which is also captured by the COMPULSION image schema; see 
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Johnson 1987: 41ff., Sweetser 1990: 69ff.). In other words, we know from our basic 
physical experience that others can affect our movements in space by pushing against us, 
or, conversely, that we can affect others’ physical movement in space by pushing against 
them. This experience is mapped onto more general and less physical experiences where 
people use a variety of strategies (including verbal strategies) in order to get others to act 
in ways that they may not want to.  
 
My concordance contains only eight examples of this kind, amounting to approximately 2 
per cent of all metaphorical examples in my data. The four expressions involving 
“support” discussed in the previous section also represent a very small proportion of the 
metaphorical references to speech activity I have analysed (2 per cent of metaphorical 
NRSAs and 1 per cent of all metaphorical NRS/NRSAs combined). However, as I have  
explained, both sets of examples are part of much larger patterns whereby assistance of 
many kinds is metaphorically constructed in terms of physical support, and compulsion 
of many kinds is metaphorically presented in terms of a physical force exercising 
pressure. Indeed, since both physical support and physical pressure involve physical 
contact between entities, these two patterns can be seen as part of the same conceptual 
scenario, in which physical contact with pressure corresponds to the verbal exercise of 
compulsion, while physical contact without pressure corresponds to the verbal provision 
of assistance.  
 
Expressions relating to physical aggression  
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discuss a range common linguistic 
expressions relating to arguments, such as “Your claims are indefensible”, “His criticism 
were right on target”, “I’ve never won an argument with him”. They conclude that 
“ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of 
WAR” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5), and therefore propose the well-known conceptual 
metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR”. This metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson argue, is based in an 
experiential correlation between verbal arguments and physical fights, which are 
common among animals generally, but which humans  “have institutionalized [. . .] in a 
number of ways, one of them being war” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 62; see Kövecses 
2002: 74-5 for a “cultural” account of the experiential basis of this metaphor).  
 
In a dictionary-based study of “metalinguistic metaphors”, Vanparys (1995) has noted, 
however, that the English expressions that construct communication in terms of fighting 
“do not necessarily make reference to a situation of war”, and are therefore best 
accounted for in terms of a more general conceptual metaphor, which he formulates as 
“VERBAL AGGRESSION IS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION” (Vanparys 1995: 31). More recently, 
Ritchie (2003) has pointed out that many of the linguistic expressions normally adduced 
as evidence for “ARGUMENT IS WAR” can also be associated with other potential source 
domains, such as sports or games like chess and bridge, and therefore proposes that the 
relevant source domain is best seen as a complex conceptual field relating to different 
types of conflict, ranging from games through fisticuffs to all-out war (Ritchie 2003: 135). 
This, he suggests, leads to a stronger account of the experiential basis of the conventional 
linguistics patterns noted by Lakoff and Johnson: although most (American) native 
speakers of English do not have first-hand experience of war, they do have direct, first-
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hand experience of many types of less extreme physical conflict, such as physical scuffles 
among children, physical contests, sports and games. Within this perspective, the fact that 
physical conflict functions as a source domain for verbal conflict has a clear experiential 
basis in bodily experience from an early age. In my discussion I will show how the 
patterns I have identified in my data are indeed more compatible with Vanparys’s and 
Ritchie’s proposals than with the traditional “ARGUMENT IS WAR” formulation (see also 
Semino forthcoming).  
 
Thirty-three references to speech activity in my concordances are realized by expressions 
that metaphorically present verbal conflict in terms of physical aggression. There is some 
variation however, in the precise nature of the physical conflict that appears to function 
as source. Some expressions are similar to those cited by Lakoff and Johnson as evidence 
for “ARGUMENT IS WAR”.  The use of the verb “bombard” in example (2) above belongs to 
this group as do the following expressions: “flare” (in “questions flaring”), “blast” (in 
“blasting Tory claims that …” and “flak” (in “flak over fat cat pay”). Three further 
examples are given below: 
 
16. amid renewed backbench sniping at the Blair style of leadership (The Guardian, 
13/5/1996) 
17. [O]nce again we were firing questions (The Daily Mirror, 13/5/1996) 
18. The Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, yesterday stepped up his guerrilla warfare 
against the Tory right by insisting that [. . .] (The Guardian, 13/5/1996) 
 
Clearly, it is possible to see such expressions as linguistic realizations of the conceptual 
metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR”. However, closer analysis reveals some difficulties. Only 
some of these examples refer to the expression of critical views in arguments or 
controversies (e.g. “stepped up his guerrilla warfare against the Tory right”), while 
others refer more generally to persistent and forceful behaviour in spoken communication, 
not necessarily within an argument as such (e.g. “bombarding with questions”). 
Moreover, the literal senses of these expressions do not just relate to war in the sense of 
organised military conflict among countries, but rather to the wider domain of armed 
violence, which also includes, for example, the activities of terrorist organisations and of 
armed criminals generally.  
 
Similar considerations apply to the use of the verbs “attack” and “defend” to refer to 
speech activities, as in the examples below:  
 
19. Last night M Delors attacked M Balladur’s idea of a “Europe of circles” in which 
each member country could progress at its own speed. (The Daily Telegraph, 
12/12/1994) 
20. The Chancellor also defended his stand on a European single currency. (The Daily 
Star, 13/5/1996) 
 
Although both “attack” and “defend” can apply literally to the context of war, their literal 
senses actually relate to physical aggression and violence more generally, as in the 
following examples from the BNC: Police attacked at acid house parties, and Michael 
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told the Old Bailey he had tried to defend his brother Lee, 13, before his father turned on 
him.  
 
My data also contains a further set of expressions in which speech activity is 
metaphorically presented in terms of low-level hostile physical action which does not 
normally involve the use of weapons. Consider the examples below:  
 
21. But Mr Straw hit back: “The changes we are talking about do not necessarily spell 
the end of the monarchy [. . .]” (The Daily Mirror, 5/12/1994) 
22. Ex-Tory chairman Lord Tebbit, in a further swipe at Mr Major, said suspending 
the rebel MPs was silly (The Daily Express, 12/12/1994) 
23. Both presenters have been slammed for fluffing their lines (The News of the 
World, 11/12/1994) 
24. He rapped his decision to remove the whip from eight MPs who voted against the 
Euro-cash bill last week. (The Daily Star, 5/12/1994) 
 
In all four cases the underlined expressions have basic physical senses to do with the 
delivery of blows against physical entities, including, in some cases, people. While “hit”, 
“swipe” and “slam” may refer to the delivery of one or more blows against someone or 
something, the physical sense of “rap” involves repeated, if more gentle, blows to an 
object, or, in a more restricted sense, somebody else’s knuckles (e.g. He told his teacher 
he had lost it on the way to school, and Mr Watson promptly rapped his knuckles with a 
ruler for his carelessness, from the BNC). In all four cases, what is being metaphorically 
referred to is the verbal expression of negative or critical attitudes towards somebody 
else’s views, decisions or behaviour. 
 
The analysis of my data therefore seems to suggest that Lakoff and Johnson’s 
formulation of the conceptual metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR” is too restricted. As far as 
the source domain is concerned, the expressions I have presented do not (or not only) 
relate to the domain of WAR, but to a more general domain, which, following Vanparys 
(1995), I will refer to as PHYSICAL AGGRESSION. This domain includes a large variety of 
forms of aggressive action, from the delivery of blows with one’s bare hands to the 
deployment of the kind of weaponry that is typically used in armed conflict between 
countries. As far as the target domain is concerned, many of my examples do refer to 
arguments (even though not necessarily in face-to-face communication), but some relate 
more generally to critical, forceful, or antagonistic communicative behaviour, which may 
not be part of an argument as such (e.g. “bombarding with questions” and “firing 
questions”), or which may not necessarily receive a reply from the addressee (e.g. “Both 
presenters have been slammed …” in example 23). It may be more appropriate, therefore, 
to regard the expressions discussed in this section as realizations of a general conceptual 
metaphor which may be referred to as “ANTAGONISTIC COMMUNICATION IS PHYSICAL 
AGGRESSION” . This conclusion is broadly compatible with Vanparys’s (1995) and 
Ritchie’s (2003) proposals, but does not deny, of course, that war is a salient part of the 
complex domain of physical aggression, and that it functions as the specific source of 
some metaphorical expressions relating to arguments. The problem with the “ARGUMENT 
IS WAR”  formulation is that it does not properly account for the linguistic evidence, and 
 17
tends to force a narrow interpretation of expressions that do not necessarily relate 
specifically either to (metaphorical) war or to (literal) arguments. 
 
It needs to be noted, however, that, like “ARGUMENT IS WAR”, “ANTAGONISTIC 
COMMUNICATION IS PHYSICAL AGGRESSION”  provides a rather general description of the 
relevant metaphorical mapping(s). In Grady’s terms, “ANTAGONISTIC COMMUNICATION IS 
PHYSICAL AGGRESSION”  is a “complex” conceptual metaphor, consisting of the 
combination of several primary metaphors. Two of the primary metaphors proposed by 
Grady can be seen as particularly relevant here. The first is “OBJECTING IS ATTACKING”  
(e.g. examples 16, 18, 19, etc.), and the second is “DAMAGE IS PHYSICAL HARM”, which 
accounts specifically for those metaphorical expressions which suggest that the target of 
critical or forceful verbal action is being physically damaged or destroyed, as in “blasting 
Tory claims that …” and other examples above. In Kövecses’s (2002) terms, these 
primary metaphors can be seen as the central mappings that result from the main meaning 
focus of the PHYSICAL AGGRESSION source domain. Some of my examples, however, 
appear to realize a slightly different metaphorical mapping, whereby engaging in 
persistent, unwelcome (communicative) behaviour towards someone else is constructed 
as physical attack. These include particularly “bombarding with questions” and “firing 
questions”, as well as, from the receiver’s perspective, expressions such as the following 
from the BNC: “We’re still limited by sexism, but at the same time we’re bombarded with 
images telling us that we have to achieve a lot’, “The traveller today is bombarded with 
information about travelling”. 
 
With 33 instances, metaphorical expressions drawing from the source domain of physical 
aggression account for approximately seven per cent of all metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in 
my two concordances. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these expressions (27) occur 
in the press section of the corpus, since news reports are often concerned with 
disagreements and debates on controversial issues, both of a private and of a public 
nature. More importantly, the expressions analysed in this section appear to be coherent 
with those I discussed in the previous sections: speech activities in interaction are 
metaphorically constructed on the basis of a physical scenario in which (i) physical 
proximity or physical contact without pressure metaphorically corresponds to a 
favourable attitude and (potential) assistance, (ii) physical contact with pressure 
corresponds to the verbal attempt to influence others’ behaviour, and (iii) physical 
aggression and violence corresponds to antagonistic communication. This scenario will 
be further developed in the following sections. 
 
Expressions relating to physical construction 
The two individual verbs that occur most frequently in my 463 metaphorical references to 
speech activity are “make” (30 instances) and “add” (54 instances). Both verbs have 
physical senses that broadly relate to the construction of physical objects. 
 
Consider the example below: 
 
25. the producers duly made a plea for more support for the British film industry. 
(The Daily Telegraph, 5/12/94) 
 18
 
The verb “make” is highly delexicalised and has a large number of non-physical 
conventional senses (e.g. “make a wish”, “make a mistake”, “make an attempt”, etc.). 
However, it is possible to identify a basic, physical sense (i.e. that of physically 
constructing a concrete object), which can be seen as acting as metaphorical source for  
non-physical uses (see also Cameron 2003: 72-3). In extract (25), for example, a 
particular speech act (a plea) is metaphorically presented as a physical entity that can be 
constructed in the process of communication. Other similar examples from the corpus 
include “make an appeal”, “make a statement”, and “make a disclaimer”. In addition, 
there are a number of expressions where “make” is followed by a direct object referring 
to a text-type or utterance-type, rather than a speech act (e.g. “make a joke”, “make a 
report”, “make a comment”). In other words, the process of verbally producing 
utterances, texts and speech acts is conventionally referred to via the most basic verb in 
English for referring to the physical construction of concrete objects (see also Vanparys 
1995: 14).  
 
The verb “add” is used slightly differently, as can be seen in the examples below: 
 
26. “But I supposed you’d go on poaching whether you were welcome or not,” she 
added with a nervous little laugh. (Huxley, A. Point Counter Point, 1928, p. 139) 
27. Mr Straw - who claimed he had the backing of his leader Tony Blair - ominously 
added that the changes did “not necessarily spell the end” of royal rule. 
(Independent on Sunday, 4/12/1994) 
 
While “make” is mostly used in NRSA constructions, “add” is used exclusively in 
reporting clauses accompanying Direct Speech (as in example 26) or Indirect Speech (as 
in example 27). In its most basic physical sense, the verb “add” refers to the process of 
putting an entity or substance together with other entities or substances (e.g. He then 
slices open the fillet to add a langoustine mousse, from the BNC). However, apart from 
its mathematical sense, it is also conventionally used to refer to increases in intensity or 
to the acquisition of extra qualities, as in the following examples from the BNC: Not to 
have made a will can only add to that stress and Including scented flowers in the display 
adds a special touch. Examples (26) and (27) demonstrate an equally conventional 
metaphorical sense relating to communication, and particularly to the process of 
resuming talk or saying something similar or relevant to what has been said before.  
 
Although the specific source and target concepts evoked by “make” and “add” in my 
examples are different, I have grouped these expressions together here because in both 
cases the (relatively) abstract and intangible process of communicating meanings is 
metaphorically constructed as a physical process, whereby objects are made and 
objects/substances are added to other objects/substances. Together, these two verbs are 
used in 18 per cent of all metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in my data, thereby forming the 
second largest group of metaphorical expressions after those relating to transfer, which 




Expressions relating to transfer 
In what has become a classic study in cognitive metaphor theory, Reddy (1979) famously 
noted that, in English, communication is often talked about in terms of the transfer of 
objects along a conduit (e.g. “You have to put each concept into words very carefully” 
and “Try to get your thoughts across better”). Reddy labelled  the underlying 
metaphorical conceptualization of communication “the conduit metaphor” (see also 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10-12 et passim on what they call “the CONDUIT metaphor”). 
Within this metaphor, Reddy argued, language “functions like a conduit, transferring 
thoughts bodily from one person to another”; speakers and writers “insert thoughts or 
feelings in the words”; words containing the thoughts and feelings are transferred to the 
addressee(s); and finally listeners or readers “extract the thoughts and feelings again from 
the words” (Reddy 1979: 170). Reddy estimated that as many as 70 per cent of the 
expressions speakers of English commonly use to talk about communication are 
instantiations of the conduit metaphor. More recently, Grady (1997: 119ff., 1998) re-
analysed Reddy’s linguistic data and proposed that the CONDUIT metaphor should be 
decomposed into a set of primary metaphors, which also motivate many conventional 
metaphorical expressions that are not to do with communication.  
 
In my data, the largest single group of metaphorical NRS/NRSAs (93 instances) contain 
expressions of the kind that led Reddy (1979) to propose the CONDUIT metaphor (see also 
Semino forthcoming). Two typical examples are given below: 
 
28. Mr Michael Portillo gave warning yesterday that the Tory right could not be 
united until … (The Daily Telegraph, 12/12/1994) 
29. Kenneth Clarke, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has delivered a defiant message 
to restless Tory backbenchers … (The Observer, 13/5/1996) 
 
In their most basic physical senses, the verbs “give” and “deliver” are to do with to the 
transfer of concrete objects in the physical world. Their use in examples such as (28) and 
(29) suggests that the production of texts/utterances and the performance of speech acts 
are constructed in terms of the transfer of physical objects from one person (the speaker) 
to others (the addressees). The verbs “give” and “deliver” are the prototypical and most 
frequently used examples of this group of metaphorical expressions in my data, but 
several other verbs are used metaphorically in the corpus in very similar ways, including:  
“issue” (e.g. “issue a command”), “leave” (e.g. “leave a message”), “offer” (e.g. “offer 
advice”), “pass on”(e.g. “pass on news”), “send” (e.g. “send a message”), and “throw” 
(e.g. “throw questions”).  
 
In Grady’s (1997: 25ff, 1998) terms, all these expressions are realizations of the primary 
metaphor “TRANSMISSION OF ENERGY IS TRANSFER (OF OBJECTS)”, which, he argues, is 
experientially grounded in the fact that the communication of meaning literally involves 
physical transfer of some sort (e.g. acoustic signals in spoken communication, physical 
objects in traditional written communication, and so on). In the examples discussed by 
Reddy and Grady, however, the range of entities that are presented as being transferred in 
expressions of this kind is restricted to the contents of an utterance/text (e.g. “give 
evidence”, “pass on news”) and to what Reddy called “Repertoire Members” (e.g. “give 
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views”). In my data, the range of such entities also includes text-types (e.g. “send a 
message”, “deliver a lecture”) and speech acts (e.g. “give warning”, “issue a 
command”). All of these entities are therefore metaphorically constructed as objects that 
can either be physically transferred from the addresser to the addressee (as in examples 
28 and 29) or made available within the communication space so that they are accessible 
to others (e.g. “issue a command”, “leave a message”). The primary metaphor 
“TRANSMISSION OF ENERGY IS TRANSFER (OF OBJECTS)” therefore also involves a general 
ontological metaphors whereby RMs, as well as utterances,  their contents and their 
illocutionary force are constructed as physical entities (but not necessarily as possessions 
in the way suggested by Grady 1997, 1998).  
 
In linguistic terms, all the expressions discussed in this section are light-verb 
constructions involving conventional metaphorical uses of verbs that are delexicalised to 
varying degrees. As a consequence, some of these verbs can be used more or less 
interchangeably. For example, “give” and “deliver” can be used interchangeably with 
direct objects such as “message”, while “give” and “issue” can be used interchangeably 
with direct objects such as “order”. In spite of their delexicalised status, however, I have 
analysed these verbs as metaphorically used in my data because it is possible in each case 
to identify a basic, physical sense which can function as source for the conventional 
metaphorical senses to do with communication (see Cameron 2003: 72-3). Indeed, where 
the various “transfer” verbs cannot be used interchangeably, the reason seems to lie in the 
residual influence of their basic physical senses (e.g. “a message” can function as direct 
object of “give” and “deliver” but is not normally used as direct object of “issue”).  
 
The group of examples I classified under the general notion of transfer also includes 
expressions such as the following: 
 
30. A master asked him on one occasion whether a word was nominative or dative, 
and back came his answer: “I don’t really care, sir!” (Callow, S. Vincent Van 
Gogh - A Life, 1990, p. 66) 
31. He admitted that Labour wanted to reduce the Queen’s powers over Parliament 
(The Daily Express, 5/12/1994) 
 
In example (30) an (impertinent) reply to a question is metaphorically presented in terms 
of movement back towards the previous speaker. Unlike what I noted in my earlier 
discussion of expressions to do with motion, therefore, in examples such as (30) 
conversational exchanges are constructed in terms of an exchange of physical objects 
between the addresser and the addressee back and forth along a conduit. A similar 
argument can be made about the use of “admit” in example (31), since the verb still 
retains the meaning of letting someone or something into a particular space, as in the 
following examples from the BNC: These gaps admit draughts and dust from the 
underfloor void and Do not even admit someone claiming to be a policeman or woman.  
In examples such as (31) the notion of letting someone or something into a physical space 
is mapped onto that of (verbally) acknowledging as true something that may be 
detrimental to one’s own case and that has usually been said by opponents in an argument. 
Sweetser (1987) also mentions “admit” as an example of a verb of Latin origin where the 
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prefix “ad-” (“(in)to”) suggests movement from the speaker to the addressee. In addition, 
she points out that the presence of the Latin prefix “re-” (“back”) in verbs referring to 
answering (e.g. “reply”, “refute”) suggests movement in the opposite direction, as is also 
the case with “back came his answer” in example (30).  
 
Overall, my data contains 93 instances of NRS/NRSAs involving expressions to do with 
physical transfer. As I mentioned earlier, these expressions constitute the largest group of 
metaphorical references to speech activity in my data, amounting to 20 per cent of all 
metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in my concordances. It is also important to notice that the 
expressions to do with transfer suggest a conceptualization of communication that is 
broadly compatible with that suggested by the expressions discussed in previous sections 
– namely as a physical space within which the communication of meanings, the 
performance of speech acts and the production of utterances/texts are presented in terms 
of the transfer of physical objects along a conduit from addressers to addressees. 
 
Expressions relating to visibility and visual representation 
Within Reddy’s (1979) account of the “CONDUIT” metaphor, meanings correspond to 
objects and linguistic expressions corresponds to containers, so that understanding 
corresponds to the emergence of the meanings/contents from the words/containers. This, 
according to Reddy, accounts for the conventional use of “reveal” in relation to verbal 
communication in expressions such as “Closer reading reveals altogether 
uncharacteristic feelings in the story” (Reddy 1979: 193).  
 
My data contains 19 similar examples of the use of “reveal”, as well as three uses of the 
verb “disclose” in expressions such as the following: 
 
32. Whitehall sources last night disclosed that the secret list [. . .] played a crucial role 
in defusing the diplomatic row (The Observer, 13/5/1996) 
 
Like “reveal”, the verb “disclose” still retains the (rather archaic) physical sense of 
making something visible by removing a cover that was hiding it from view (e.g. He 
cleared away the grass and disclosed a narrow opening descending into the darkness, 
from the BNC).  
 
Grady (1998) explains this kind of expression in terms of the primary metaphor 
“INFORMATION IS CONTENTS”, and goes on to consider “further motivation for the 
containment image which applies so naturally to linguistic forms” (Grady 1998: 214). He 
proposes that one salient motivation is the primary metaphor “BECOMING ACCESSIBLE IS 
EMERGING”. He explains the relevance of this metaphor as follows: 
 
There are numerous linguistic examples which reflect a metaphoric association 
between perceptibility and location outside a container. The motivation for such a 
metaphor could not be more natural, of course, since perceptibility is literally 
correlated with location out in the open in so many cases. (Grady 1998: 214) 
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Grady (1998) also points out that the well-known conceptual metaphor “KNOWING IS 
SEEING” is based on the same kind of experiential correlation, and proposes two separate 
primary metaphors where the source domain involves location outside a container: 
“PERCEPTIBLE IS ‘OUT’” (e.g. “Heat brings out the flavor in the soup”) and “ACCESSIBLE 
TO AWARENESS IS ‘OUT’” (e.g. “The facts in the case will come out sooner or later”) 
(Grady 1997: 296). In addition, Grady (1997: 297) considers expressions such as “Why 
did you have to bring that up again?” , and puts forward the primary metaphor 
“ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS ‘UP’”, which, he argues, is based on “the 
correlation between being in a higher position―e.g., at eye level, or out from under an 
obstruction―and being perceptible” (Grady 1997: 297). 
 
My corpus contains many examples where the expression and reception of meaning in 
speech is metaphorically presented in terms of visibility and emergence. These 
expressions differ, however, with respect to how exactly meanings are made 
metaphorically visible to addressees. I will discuss each of the three main patterns I have 
identified in turn.  
 
Movement into view  
Twenty of the metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in the corpus can be related to Grady’s 
“ACCESSIBLE TO AWARENESS IS ‘OUT’” or “BECOMING ACCESSIBLE IS EMERGING” primary 
metaphors. However, these expressions suggest a somewhat more complicated picture 
than that proposed by Grady. Consider the following examples: 
 
33. It is an indication of how low Kylie’s emotional defences were during this crisis 
that – just for once – the intensely personal details of her life suddenly came 
gushing out (Stone, S., Kylie Minogue: The Superstar Next Door, 1990, p. 55) 
34. “You want to -” was all he got out before Paulie snapped, (McDermid, V. Dead 
Beat, 1992, p. 168) 
 
Both the expressions “come gushing out” and “get out” have physical senses that relate to 
movement out of a container or a bounded space. However, here it is not the words or the 
text that correspond to a container. Rather, the speakers themselves (respectively, the 
pop-singer Kylie Minogue and a character called Dennis) are implicitly constructed as 
containers, from which meanings come out via language. More precisely, in example (33), 
the contents of the speaker’s utterances (the intensely personal details of her life) are 
presented as the agent of the movement; in example (34), the speaking character is 
presented as attempting to get particular meanings out of himself. These examples, 
therefore, appear to realize both “ACCESSIBLE TO AWARENESS IS ‘OUT’/BECOMING 
ACCESSIBLE IS EMERGING” and “THE BODY IS A CONTAINER” (see also Vanparys 1995: 24-6).   
 
It is not always the case, however, that the metaphorical references to visibility and 
emergence in my data also involve explicit or implicit references to movement out of 
containers. My concordances include one instance of the use of “bring up” in the sense of 
“mention” that was noticed by Grady, as well as examples such as the following: 
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35. [S]enior medical staff [. . .] raised doubts  about the accuracy of the American-
developed test used in her diagnosis. (The Observer, 28/4/1996 
36. But he floated  Tom King’s suggestion that …  (Thatcher, M. The Downing Street 
Years, 1993, p. 854) 
 
Example (35) is one of five cases in the corpus where the verb “raise” is used in reference 
to verbal activity, with direct objects referring to speech acts or to what Reddy calls RMs 
(“doubts”, “alarm”, “objections”, “questions”). Give that, in its physical sense, the verb 
“raise” suggests movement from below upwards, its use in my examples can be seen as a 
realization of Grady’s “ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS ‘UP’” primary metaphor. 
Within this perspective, the conventional use of “raise” in relation to communication is 
based in our visual experience, where, if something is positioned too low, it may be 
outside the observer’s field of vision, so that movement upwards involves movement into 
view. The conventional use of “float” in example (36) is rather different, but can also be 
explained in terms of a mapping from visual experience: in its physical sense, this verb 
involves both permanence on the surface of the water (and hence visibility) and 
movement with the current (and hence, possibly, towards the addressee and into their 
field of vision). The corpus also contains two instances of the use of the verb “put 
forward” in reference to speech activity (e.g. “I put forward the view that”), which seem 
to work in a similar way. 
 
Clearly, the expressions analysed in this section confirm the correlation, noted by Grady, 
Lakoff and Johnson and others, between (1) knowledge and vision and (2) the expression 
of meaning and emergence/movement into view. However, my data shows that what may 
act as source domain is not just emergence via movement upwards or out of a container, 
but rather movement towards the addressee more generally. This could be explained in 
terms of a metaphor along the lines of “ACCESSIBLE TO AWARENESS/CONSIDERATION IS ‘IN 
FRONT’” ,  which may also motivate, for example, the conventional uses of the verb 
“face” in expressions such as the following, from the BNC: “We must face the facts” and 
“The defence establishment is faced with a dual problem”.  This metaphor has a similar 
experiential basis as Grady’s “ACCESSIBLE TO AWARENESS IS ‘OUT’” and “ACCESSIBLE TO 
AWARENSS IS ‘UP’”: in visual experience, there is a correlation between the positioning of  
an object in front of us and our ability to perceive its properties. At a more general level, 
all these expressions can be related to “KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING”, which, 
according to Grady (1997: 296) has as a corollary “CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT”. On the 
basis of my examples, I could suggest the converse corollary, namely “ACCESSIBLE TO 
AWARENESS/CONSIDERATION IS VISIBLE”. Together these conceptual metaphors can 
therefore explain why communication is conventionally metaphorically presented in 
terms of different types of movements into view.  
 
Pointing 
A further set of 23 examples from my data involve metaphorical references to verbal 
activity in terms of the physical actions of pointing or indicating:  
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37. Officials at the Department of Energy still wanted to commission Pressurised 
Water Reactors which were an American development, pointing to the success of 
the French nuclear industry (Adams, J. Tony Benn, 1992, p. 442) 
38. Only last Friday John Major pointed out that Labour’s plans [. . .] would lead to 
the break-up of the UK. (The Daily Express, 5/12/1994) 
39. Senior Cabinet sources indicated that the rebels would not be offered any more 
compromises by the government. (Independent on Sunday, 4/12/1994) 
 
In examples (37) and (38), the verbs “point to” and “point out” are used to refer 
metaphorically to the action of mentioning something that is relevant to and supports the 
speakers’ argument. In example (39) the verb “indicate” is used to refer to the verbal 
provision of new, relevant information. In all three cases, verbal communication is 
metaphorically presented in terms of a physical scenario in which speakers make 
meanings/ideas/facts accessible not by moving them into the addressee’s field of vision 
but by indicating their existence and location to the addressee (in fact, the expression 
“point out” involves both a metaphorical reference to the physical act of pointing and the 
notion of emergence from containers in the prepositional adverb “out”). Within this 
scenario, meanings are therefore constructed as physical entities that are potentially 
visible but that may not be noticed by the addressee without the speaker’s intervention.  
 
The use of these expressions can be related to Grady’s (1997: 296) “CONSIDERING IS 
LOOKING AT” primary metaphor, which he presents as a corollary of “KNOWING IS SEEING”, 
and exemplifies with expressions such as “We’ll be taking a good, long look at him as a 
suspect in this case” (Grady 1997: 296). However, in my examples the focus is on what 
the speaker/writer does in order to enable the addressee to “look at” the meanings that he 
or she is trying to convey. The BNC contains many examples of “point out” and “point 
to” being used in the same ways as in 37 and 38. There are also many examples of the use 
of the verb “point to” in which the entity presented as the agent of the pointing action is 
not the speaker/writer but a text or some other entity (e.g. “The evidence [. . .] pointed to 
a fire on board the DC-8 before it crashed”). In all these cases whatever is being pointed 
out/to is not just offered for consideration, but also presented as a true and relevant fact 
within the relevant discourse context. On the basis of this, I would propose a primary 
metaphor along the lines of “ENABLING KNOWLEDGE/CONSIDERATION IS 
POINTING/INDICATING”. This metaphor is clearly closely related with both “KNOWING IS 
SEEING” and “CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT”, and also to Grady’s “EXISTENCE IS VISIBILITY”. 
The latter is a primary metaphor that Grady (1997: 284) proposes in order to explain 
examples such as “The dodo disappeared in the 1600s” and “Rap music first appeared in 
the late 70s”. As Grady puts it, this metaphor is based on “the correlation between our 
awareness of objects (i.e. knowledge of their existence) and their presence within our 
field of vision” (Grady 1997: 284). This correlation helps to explain why the use of 
“point to”, “point out” and “indicate” in my examples suggests that whatever is being 
pointed out/to or indicated is “true”: in basic, perceptual experience, if something can be 
shown via pointing, it can also be seen; if it can be seen, it exists, and is therefore “true”.  
 
Visual representation  
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The corpus also contains six examples of NRSA in which verbal activity is 
metaphorically referred to by means of expressions which have basic senses to do with 
visual representation, as shown below: 
 
40. Mr Jack Straw, the party’s home affairs spokesman, outlined proposals to redefine 
the Queen’s role and reduce the size of the Royal Family. (The Daily Telegraph, 
5/12/1994) 
41. Kenneth Clarke, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has delivered a defiant message 
to restless Tory backbenchers, portraying himself as a staunch defender of the 
welfare state. (The Observer, 13/5/1996) 
 
In (40) the verbal expression of particular plans in broad, general terms is metaphorically 
presented in terms of providing an outline, i.e. a visual representation that shows the 
outer edges or shape of the represented objects, rather than the details. In (41) the verbal 
expression of a particular opinion on something (in this case the speaker himself) is 
metaphorically presented in terms of visual portrayal. Another similar expression 
contained in the corpus is “to represent (someone or something) as …”. In all these 
examples the notion of making a visual representation is mapped onto that of expressing 
particular meanings or opinions in words. In fact, these verbs can be metaphorically 
applied to the communication of meaning generally (i.e. not necessarily via words), as in 
the following extracts from the BNC:  “Table 18 outlines these limitations” and “The 
Manor House itself dates from the 13th. century but it has now been restored to portray 
how this ancient building was the centre of a thriving farm at the turn of the century.”  
 
All of these examples may be explained in terms of a conventional metaphorical mapping 
from the source domain of VISUAL REPRESENTATION to the target domain of 
COMMUNICATION. The latter is to be intended in the broadest possible sense, i.e. including 
informing, suggesting, explaining, or generally enabling the construction of particular 
meanings. This metaphor, which could be referred to as “ENABLING 
KNOWLEDGE/CONSIDERATION IS PROVIDING A VISUAL REPRESENTATION”, is clearly closely 
connected with “KNOWING IS SEEING” and the other visual metaphors I have discussed so 
far. 
 
Overall, therefore, the expressions discussed in the whole of this section construct 
communication in terms of making visual perception possible in a number of different 
ways, namely by: 
i. moving an entity out of a container, upwards, or towards the addressee; 
ii. physically pointing at/indicating something that is potentially visible but may not 
be seen or noticed by the addressee; 
iii. creating visual images that the addressee can see. 
 
The corpus also contains the following interesting example, which does not fall under any 
of the patterns above, but which is clearly related to them: 
 
 26
42. After Claudie had reluctantly and shamefacedly put him in the picture about 
Cardinal’s Wharf, he became really interested. (Worsthorne, P. Tricks of Memory. 
An Autobiography: Peregrine Worsthorne, 1993, p. 125) 
 
Here the first person narrator’s wife is talking to a doctor about a mysterious illness that 
is affecting her husband. Part of this involves explaining the unhygienic conditions in 
which they live in Cardinal’s Wharf in London. This explanation is metaphorically 
referred to by means of the conventional expression “putting (someone) in the picture”. 
Here a visual representation (“the picture”) seems to correspond to the meanings or 
contents that are being communicated, and the speaker’s role is presented as physically 
placing the addressee inside the picture. In other words, in this expression the meanings 
or contents themselves are presented as a container or a bounded region which can be 
entered in order for understanding to take place. Once again, the relevant experiential 
basis seems to be the correlation between being able to see something and knowing about 
it, so that speech activity is metaphorically presented as enabling others to see (see 
Vanparys 1995: 16-17 for more examples).  
 
In her study of the historical development of verbs for mental and verbal activities, 
Sweetser (1987: 448) notices that mental verbs often come from the domain of physical 
vision (e.g. “see”), while speech act verbs do not. My data shows that, indeed, some 
speech activity verbs have physical senses to do with enabling vision. This suggests a 
coherent metaphorical scenario in which knowledge/understanding is constructed in 
terms of visual perception, and communication (which enables knowledge/understanding) 
is constructed in terms of enabling visual perception.  
 
Cumulatively, the different types of expressions relating to visibility and emergence 
discussed in this section account for 77 examples of NRS/NRSAs in my concordances, 
amounting to 16.5 per cent of all metaphorical references to speech activity in my data. 
This represents the third largest group, after expressions to do with the transfer of objects 
(20 per cent) and with the physical construction of objects (18 per cent). By adding 
together the different types of expressions that Reddy would have subsumed under the 
CONDUIT metaphor (i.e. those to do with transfer and visibility/emergence), we can 
therefore account for 36.5 of all metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in my data and just under five 
per cent of all the references to speech activity I analysed. Although this is a substantial 
proportion of metaphorical NRS/NRSAs in my concordances, it is considerably less than 
Reddy’s estimate that 70 per cent of all commonly used expressions for communication 
in English are realizations of the CONDUIT metaphor. As I have shown in the course of the 
paper, English has a much larger variety of conventional expressions for (spoken) 





The overall picture 
The patterns I have discussed in this paper account for approximately 74 per cent of all 
metaphorical NRSs and NRSAs in my data (i.e. 343 of the 463 NRS/NRSAs that I 
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analysed as metaphorical out of the 3,548 occurrences included in the two concordances 
from the corpus). I do not have the space here to discuss the remaining 26 per cent of my 
metaphorical data, which includes some further patterns (e.g. the metaphorical use of 
mental verbs such as “observe”, and of verbs evoking animal behaviour, such as “snarl” 
and “coo”), as well as many individual expressions that do not appear to be part of larger 
patterns (e.g. “crack jokes”, “have a go at”). Table 1 provides an overview of the 
numbers of occurrences of expressions evoking each of the source domains I have 
discussed, and of the percentage of cases they represent out of all metaphorical NRSs, all 
metaphorical NRSAs, and all NRSs and NRSAs combined.  
 
The table shows that the expressions relating to the transfer of objects form the largest 
group, followed by expressions to do with the production of physical objects, and 
expressions to do with visibility and visual representation. The remaining patterns are 
less frequent, but each does account for a non-negligible proportion of all metaphorical 
references to speech activity in my data. More importantly, however, I have shown that 
some of the patterns that are less frequent in my data (e.g. those to do with physical 
pressure and support) are actually part of much larger metaphorical patterns in English 
that apply to a wide range of target domains beyond spoken communication. 
 
Table 1 – Number of occurrences of expressions belonging to different metaphorical 
















57 (22.5%) 27 (13%) 84 (18%) 
Visibility and visual 
representation 
 
49 (20%) 28   (13%) 77 (16.5%) 
Movement 21 (8.5%) 14   (6.5%) 35 (7.5%) 
Physical aggression 6  (2.5%) 27   (13%) 33 (7%) 
Physical proximity -   9   (4%) 9 (2%) 
Physical pressure   1 (0.5%)   7   (3%) 8 (2%) 
Physical support -   4   (2%) 4 (1%) 










Overall, my analysis has shown that complex domains such as spoken communication are 
metaphorically structured by a set of different source domains. These source domains 
tend to (i) have an image-schematic basis, (ii) have a wide metaphorical scope, and (iii) 
structure one or more particular aspects of the target via their own most salient and 
distinctive aspects. More specifically, the complexity of target domains such as speech 
 28
activity results from the fact that it includes a wide variety of aspects, namely elements, 
processes, actions, relationships and goals. Many of these aspects are shared by other 
target domains, and are therefore metaphorically structured by the same (aspects of the 
same) source domains. For example, as I have shown, one aspect of the domain of spoken 
communication is the provision of help/assistance to others via speech, which can be 
expressed metaphorically in terms of physical support. The notion of help/assistance, 
however, is also part of many other areas of experience (e.g. family relationships, 
interpersonal relationships generally, sports, politics, economics, and so on), and can 
therefore be expressed in terms of physical support in relation to many different target 
domains, as others have pointed out (e.g. Grady 1997, Lakoff and Johnson 1999). One 
way of capturing these more general patterns that cut across many different areas of 
experience is via Grady’s primary metaphors, which, as I have shown, can often explain 
both the patterns I found in my data and the fact that the same expressions can also be 
applied to domains other than speech activity. As I mentioned earlier, Kövecses (2002) 
accounts for the same phenomena via the notion of central mappings that project the main 
meaning focus of wide-scope source domains onto a wide range of target domains. 
 
In my analysis I also identified the main aspects of speech activity that tend to be 
constructed metaphorically, the source domains that are involved in each case, and the 
wider applicability of the sets of expressions resulting from each source domain. For 
example, a central aspect of the domain of speech activity is the expression of meanings 
so that others can understand them. This aspect, as Reddy (1979) originally noted, is 
metaphorically constructed in terms of the transfer and visibility of objects, which, as 
Grady (1998) has pointed out, are also applied to the expression and understanding of 
meaning generally, i.e. not just via speech or language. Another central aspect of the 
domain of speech activity is the expression and negotiation of mutual relationships, 
which are metaphorically constructed via expressions to do with physical proximity, 
support and pressure. These expressions are also conventionally applied to social 
interaction and relationship generally, i.e. not simply in the context of verbal 
communication. A more specific aspect of speech activity is the expression of negative 
attitudes in order to cause damage to others and their goals. This aspect is metaphorically 
constructed in terms of expressions to do with physical aggression which also apply to 
other areas of experience involving negative attitudes and negative effects. In addition, 
the production of messages and speech acts is presented in terms of the physical notions 
of making concrete objects and adding to them, which conventionally apply to many 
abstract processes and entities. And finally, the achievement of goals in and via speech is 
constructed in the same ways as goals more generally, i.e. as destinations to be reached.  
 
As a consequence of all this, I have argued that the most appropriate level of abstraction 
for the formulation of conceptual metaphors is that of primary metaphors, which capture 
simple mappings that participate in the construction of many complex target domains. 
This results in a more exhaustive and accurate view of linguistic patterns, and of possible 
underlying conceptual mappings, than any generalizations that start from complex target 
domains (e.g. “SPEECH ACTIVITY IS …” or “COMMUNICATION IS …”). This approach also 
results in a more economical and cognitively plausible account of how metaphorical 
mappings might be stored in conceptual structure, since a relatively small number of 
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simple and basic mappings can explain the production and reception of a very large 
number of linguistic expressions in many different contexts. 
 
At the same time, this approach can also lead to more reliable accounts of the 
metaphorical structuring of particular target domains. Although the conceptual metaphors 
that motivate the different linguistic patterns are not always consistent with one another, 
the main patterns I have identified can be combined into a coherent single 
conceptualisation of spoken communication in terms of a physical space containing 
entities corresponding to the interactants, their speech acts, their utterances/texts, their 
views/ideas, and so on. Within this space: 
• interactants can move in or out, towards or away from other participants, speech acts, 
conversational goals (e.g. “step in with congratulations”, “join the condolences”, 
“backtrack”); 
• interactants can be positioned in different ways in relation to each other (e.g. “back”, 
“stand by”); 
• interactants can come into physical contact with each other in different ways, i.e. with 
or without pressure (e.g. “press”, “support”) or engaging in different types of 
physical aggression (e.g. “rap”, “hit out”, “blast”); 
• speech acts and texts/utterances can be physically constructed (“make a plea”), added 
to (“add”) and transferred from addressers to addressees (e.g. “give an order”, 
“deliver a speech”). 
• texts/utterances, their contents, or their illocutionary force can become visually 
accessible to the addressee via different types of movement (e.g. “came gushing out”, 
“raise doubts”), pointing (e.g. “point to”), or visual representation (e.g. “outline”). 
 
I am not suggesting that the above scenario “exists” as a single conceptualization in the 
minds of any, let alone all, speakers of English. What I am suggesting is that the main 
patterns I have identified in my data seem to indicate that speech activity is 
conceptualised in English in terms of a range of physical actions and interactions which, 
at a general level, are compatible with each other and can be integrated into a single 
scenario. 
 
Final methodological considerations 
The last few years have seen a rise in the use of electronic corpora in metaphor research 
(e.g. Boers 1999, Cameron and Deignan 2003, Deignan 1999, 2000; Peters and Wilks 
2003, Semino 2002, Semino et al. 2004). These studies show how the adoption of a 
corpus-based approach, coupled with an explicit and rigorous identification procedure 
(e.g. Cameron 2003: 58ff.), can lead to important advances in our understanding of 
metaphorical patterns in language, and also place the extrapolation of conceptual 
metaphors from linguistic evidence on a much firmer empirical footing than it has been in 
the past.  
 
In the present study, the adoption of a corpus methodology has enabled me to arrive at 
results that are, I believe, more exhaustive and reliable than those obtained on the basis of 
introspection and/or the random collection of examples. First, my data was obtained from 
a balanced and representative quarter-of-a-million word corpus of (late) 20th century 
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written British narrative texts. Second, the fact that the corpus was annotated for forms of 
SW&TP provided me with a fairly large number of relevant examples (3,548 references 
to speech acts/activity, of which 463 were analysed as metaphorical). Third, I 
systematically used a larger corpus (the 100-million word British National Corpus) in 
order to provide examples of other (not speech-related) uses of the expressions under 
analysis (see Cameron and Deignan 2003 and Semino 2002 for a similar combination of 
smaller and larger corpora in metaphor research). All this has enabled me to notice a 
larger and richer variety of metaphorical linguistic patterns for speech activity than had 
been observed before, which in turn has put me in a better position to make claims about 
possible underlying conceptual metaphors. I have also been able to compare the 
frequencies of different patterns of metaphorical expressions in my data. Inevitably, 
however, the overall picture I have proposed can only be an advance on what previous 
studies have achieved, and will in turn need to be further refined and completed by 
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